Background: |
 
The SIAD BARRE regime was ousted in January 1991; turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy have followed for thirteen years. In May of 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence, aided by the overwhelming dominance of a ruling clan and economic infrastructure left behind by British, Russian, and American military assistance programs. The regions of Bari and Nugaal and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring self-declared autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998, but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides towards reconstructing a legitimate, representative government, but has suffered civil strife in 2002. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland as it also claims portions of eastern Sool and Sanaag. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in the south) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995, having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restored. The mandate of the Transitional National Government (TNG), created in August 2000 in Arta, Djibouti, expired in August 2003. Discussions regarding the establishment of a new government are ongoing in Kenya. Numerous warlords and factions are still fighting for control of Mogadishu and the other southern regions. Suspicion of Somali links with global terrorism further complicates the picture. |
Location: |
Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of Ethiopia |
Geographic coordinates: |
10 00 N, 49 00 E |
Map references: |
Africa |
Area: |
total: 637,657 sq km
land: 627,337 sq km
water: 10,320 sq km |
Area - comparative: |
slightly smaller than Texas |
Land boundaries: |
total: 2,340 km
border countries: Djibouti 58 km, Ethiopia 1,600 km, Kenya 682 km |
Coastline: |
3,025 km |
Maritime claims: |
territorial sea: 200 nm |
Climate: |
principally desert; December to February - northeast monsoon, moderate temperatures in north and very hot in south; May to October - southwest monsoon, torrid in the north and hot in the south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons |
Terrain: |
mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north |
Elevation extremes: |
lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m
highest point: Shimbiris 2,416 m |
Natural resources: |
uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, natural gas, likely oil reserves |
Land use: |
arable land: 1.67%
permanent crops: 0.04%
other: 98.29% (2001) |
Irrigated land: |
2,000 sq km (1998 est.) |
Natural hazards: |
recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; floods during rainy season |
Environment - current issues: |
famine; use of contaminated water contributes to human health problems; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification |
Environment - international agreements: |
party to: Endangered Species, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection |
Geography - note: |
strategic location on Horn of Africa along southern approaches to Bab el Mandeb and route through Red Sea and Suez Canal |
Population: |
8,304,601
note: this estimate was derived from an official census taken in 1975 by the Somali Government; population counting in Somalia is complicated by the large number of nomads and by refugee movements in response to famine and clan warfare (July 2004 est.) |
Age structure: |
0-14 years: 44.7% (male 1,860,451; female 1,849,484)
15-64 years: 52.7% (male 2,197,572; female 2,176,762)
65 years and over: 2.7% (male 94,905; female 125,427) (2004 est.) |
Median age: |
total: 17.6 years
male: 17.5 years
female: 17.6 years (2004 est.) |
Population growth rate: |
3.41% (2004 est.) |
Birth rate: |
46.04 births/1,000 population (2004 est.) |
Death rate: |
17.3 deaths/1,000 population (2004 est.) |
Net migration rate: |
5.37 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2004 est.) |
Sex ratio: |
at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.01 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1.01 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.76 male(s)/female
total population: 1 male(s)/female (2004 est.) |
Infant mortality rate: |
total: 118.52 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 127.95 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 108.81 deaths/1,000 live births (2004 est.) |
Life expectancy at birth: |
total population: 47.71 years
male: 46.02 years
female: 49.46 years (2004 est.) |
Total fertility rate: |
6.91 children born/woman (2004 est.) |
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate: |
1% (2001 est.) |
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS: |
43,000 (2001 est.) |
HIV/AIDS - deaths: |
NA |
Major infectious diseases: |
typhoid fever, dengue fever, malaria, rabies, schistosomiasis
overall degree of risk: very high (2004) |
Nationality: |
noun: Somali(s)
adjective: Somali |
Ethnic groups: |
Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including Arabs 30,000) |
Religions: |
Sunni Muslim |
Languages: |
Somali (official), Arabic, Italian, English |
Literacy: |
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 37.8%
male: 49.7%
female: 25.8% (2001 est.) |
Country name: |
conventional long form: none
conventional short form: Somalia
former: Somali Republic, Somali Democratic Republic |
Government type: |
no permanent national government; transitional, parliamentary national government |
Capital: |
Mogadishu |
Administrative divisions: |
18 regions (plural - NA, singular - gobolka); Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiraan, Jubbada Dhexe, Jubbada Hoose, Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe, Shabeellaha Hoose, Sool, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed |
Independence: |
1 July 1960 (from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on 1 July 1960, to form the Somali Republic) |
National holiday: |
Foundation of the Somali Republic, 1 July (1960); note - 26 June (1960) in Somaliland |
Constitution: |
25 August 1979, presidential approval 23 September 1979
note: the Transitional National Government formed in August 2000 had a three-year mandate to create a new constitution and hold elections, this goal was not achieved but the process is ongoing |
Legal system: |
no national system; Shari'a and secular courts are in some localities |
Suffrage: |
18 years of age; universal |
Executive branch: |
chief of state: Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed (since 14 October 2004); note - a new Transitional Federal Government consisting of a 275-member parliamnet was established in October 2004 replacing the Transitional National Government created in 2000
head of government: Prime Minister Ali Muhammad GHEDI (since 3 November 2004)
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the prime minister
election results: Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed, the leader of the Puntland region of Somalia, was elected president by the Transitional Federal Government |
Legislative branch: |
unicameral National Assembly
note: fledgling parliament; a 275-member Transitional Federal Government replaced the Transitional National Government created in 2000; the new parliament consists of 61 seats assigned to each of four large clan groups (Darod, Digil-Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye) with the remaining 31 seats divided between minority clans |
Judicial branch: |
following the breakdown of national government, most regions have reverted to either Islamic (Shari'a) law with a provision for appeal of all sentences, or traditional clan-based arbitration |
Political parties and leaders: |
none |
Political pressure groups and leaders: |
numerous clan and subclan factions are currently vying for power |
International organization participation: |
ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ITU, LAS, NAM, OIC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO |
Diplomatic representation in the US: |
Somalia does not have an embassy in the US (ceased operations on 8 May 1991); note - the TNG and other factions have representatives in Washington and at the United Nations |
Diplomatic representation from the US: |
the US does not have an embassy in Somalia; US interests are represented by the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya at Mombasa Road; mailing address: P. O. Box 30137, Unit 64100, Nairobi; APO AE 09831; telephone: [254] (2) 537800; FAX [254] (2) 537810 |
Flag description: |
light blue with a large white five-pointed star in the center; blue field influenced by the flag of the UN |
Government - note: |
although an interim government was created in 2000 other governing bodies continue to exist and control various cities and regions of the country, including Somaliland, Puntland, and traditional clan and faction strongholds |
Economy - overview: |
Somalia's economic fortunes are being driven by its deep political divisions. The northern area has declared its independence as "Somaliland"; the central area, Puntland, is a self-declared autonomous state; and the remaining southern portion is riddled with the struggles of rival factions. Economic life continues, in part because much activity is local and relatively easily protected. Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and about 65% of export earnings, but Saudi Arabia's recent ban on Somali livestock, because of Rift Valley Fever concerns, has severely hampered the sector. Nomads and semi-nomads, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, qat, and machined goods are the principal imports. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and sold as scrap metal. Despite the seeming anarchy, Somalia's service sector has managed to survive and grow. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money exchange services have sprouted throughout the country, handling between million and million in remittances annually. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to the newest electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate, and militias provide security. The ongoing civil disturbances and clan rivalries, however, have interfered with any broad-based economic development and international aid arrangements. In 2002 Somalia's overdue financial obligations to the IMF continued to grow. Statistics on Somalia's GDP, growth, per capita income, and inflation should be viewed skeptically. |
GDP: |
purchasing power parity - .361 billion (2004 est.) |
GDP - real growth rate: |
2.1% (2004 est.) |
GDP - per capita: |
purchasing power parity - (2004 est.) |
GDP - composition by sector: |
agriculture: 65%
industry: 10%
services: 25% (2000 est.) |
Population below poverty line: |
NA |
Household income or consumption by percentage share: |
lowest 10%: NA
highest 10%: NA |
Inflation rate (consumer prices): |
note - businesses print their own money, so inflation rates cannot be sensibly determined (2003 est.) |
Labor force: |
3.7 million (very few are skilled laborers) |
Labor force - by occupation: |
agriculture (mostly pastoral nomadism) 71%, industry and services 29% |
Unemployment rate: |
NA |
Budget: |
revenues: NA
expenditures: NA, including capital expenditures of NA |
Agriculture - products: |
cattle, sheep, goats; bananas, sorghum, corn, coconuts, rice, sugarcane, mangoes, sesame seeds, beans; fish |
Industries: |
a few light industries, including sugar refining, textiles, petroleum refining (mostly shut down), wireless communication |
Industrial production growth rate: |
NA |
Electricity - production: |
245.1 million kWh (2001) |
Electricity - consumption: |
227.9 million kWh (2001) |
Electricity - exports: |
0 kWh (2001) |
Electricity - imports: |
0 kWh (2001) |
Oil - production: |
0 bbl/day (2001 est.) |
Oil - consumption: |
4,000 bbl/day (2001 est.) |
Oil - exports: |
NA (2001) |
Oil - imports: |
NA (2001) |
Oil - proved reserves: |
0 bbl (1 January 2002) |
Natural gas - proved reserves: |
2.832 billion cu m (1 January 2002) |
Exports: |
million f.o.b. (2002 est.) |
Exports - commodities: |
livestock, bananas, hides, fish, charcoal, scrap metal |
Exports - partners: |
UAE 37.2%, Yemen 22.3%, Oman 10.1%, China 6%, Kuwait 4.4%, Nigeria 4% (2003) |
Imports: |
million f.o.b. (2002 est.) |
Imports - commodities: |
manufactures, petroleum products, foodstuffs, construction materials, qat |
Imports - partners: |
Djibouti 33.9%, Kenya 15.5%, Brazil 6.6%, UAE 5.1%, Thailand 4.2% (2003) |
Debt - external: |
.6 billion (2000 est.) |
Economic aid - recipient: |
million (1999 est.) |
Currency: |
Somali shilling (SOS) |
Currency code: |
SOS |
Exchange rates: |
Somali shillings per US dollar - 11,000 (November 2000), 2,620 (January 1999), 7,500 (November 1997 est.), 7,000 (January 1996 est.), 5,000 (1 January 1995)
note: the Republic of Somaliland, a self-declared independent country not recognized by any foreign government, issues its own currency, the Somaliland shilling |
Fiscal year: |
NA |
Highways: |
total: 22,100 km
paved: 2,608 km
unpaved: 19,492 km (1999 est.) |
Pipelines: |
crude oil 15 km |
Ports and harbors: |
Boosaaso, Berbera, Chisimayu (Kismaayo), Merca, Mogadishu |
Merchant marine: |
none |
Airports: |
60 (2003 est.) |
Airports - with paved runways: |
total: 6
over 3,047 m: 4
2438 to 3047 m: 1
1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 (2003 est.) |
Airports - with unpaved runways: |
total: 54
2,438 to 3,047 m: 4
1,524 to 2,437 m: 19
914 to 1,523 m: 29
under 914 m: 2 (2003 est.) |
This page was last updated on 30 November, 2004
Prefaces
These purpose of this Discussion Paper is to stimulate discussion among Somalis and their neighbors on the political possibilities for reunifying the Somali people.
The background information for the information and proposals presented in this Discussion Paper comes from the research already performed for writing a larger book with the title: "Somaligate: The Decision to Suppress Democracy in Somalia", by Abdulkarim Ahmed Guleid and Jack L. Davies. The current draft for this book has over 400 typeset pages. This book attempts to document in detail what went wrong in Somalia. This current Discussion Paper only contains a summary of some relevant documentation from this book.
The focus of this new Discussion Paper is upon stimulating local discussion on
defining a long-range goal of regional integration on the Horn of Africa that allows defacto reunification of the Somali people without changing any of the current post-colonial borders,
defining an immediate goal for creating a new genuinely-democratic government in Southern Somalia (the former Italian Somalia),
defining an intermediate goal of creating a loose federation between the Republic of Somaliland and Southern Somalia, as soon as the later has reunified itself under a new democratic government, and
strategies for achieving these three goals.
This shorter Discussion Paper uses background information from "Somaligate" to seek a consensus on the recent past as a basis for making specific political proposals for discussion on ways to find quick solutions to the problems of the Somali people today. We expect to revise it several times to reflect early reactions and new inputs.
The first draft for this Discussion Paper, dated 24 October 1994, was originally written as an internal memorandum for our book project and was revised on 16 December 1994. This is the 3rd revised edition. We hope to be able to revise it several more times -- integrating the reactions to each version.
As the author of this Discussion Paper, I am deeply indebted to the information and contacts provided by my co-author of the book, Abdulkarim Ahmed Guleid. However, I alone assume responsibility for the proposals presented here.
Munich, 20 February 1995
Jack L. Davies
Davies Consulting GmbH
Preface to Publication of the Third Edition
It was a disappointment that funding was not available for immediately publishing and distributing this Discussion Paper to the Somali people immediately at the end of January 1995.
It is now a matching pleasure that Dr. Wilhelm Löwenstein and his colleagues at the Institute for Development Research and Development Politics at the Ruhr-University of Bochum in Germany have generously offered to publish and distribute this Discussion Paper.
The only significant change in the third printing was to add Appendix 4 on the Somali ethnic group and clan system -- primarily for non-Somali readers to assist them in understanding the clan system which is so important for understanding Somali politics. Corrections and additions to the charts for the individual groups of clans and clans from Somali readers would be greatly appreciated. In this case, we ask that Somali readers give their own names, and the names of friends, as many generations back as possible to accurately fill in the missing holes and chains.
Criticism and comments from readers are welcome to the address given above. If it becomes appropriate to create a new revised edition, these comments from readers will be integrated as far as feasible.
Munich, 1 September 1996
Jack L. Davies
Davies Consulting GmbH
Preface to the On-line Version of the Third Edition
Because the original intent of this book was to assist the Somali people in determining their own destiny, it has now been republished as an on-line version with the Civic Webs Virtual Library. The goal has been to make this book available as a reference source for the Somali people, wherever they may be, as long as they have access to the Internet.
The original hard-copy printed version is still available from the University of Bochum in Germany. We are thankful to them for their continued support for this project.
Some reformatting was required to take advantage of the different technology of on-line publishing. We have not yet been able to include the equivalent of the printed Index, which was useful in selecting names and then finding the pages where they occurred. But, we may be able to include an equivalent means in the near future.
We have added hyperlinks to related resources available on the Internet wherever possible. The text itself has not been changed, other than a few "Editor's Notes" to indicate that this information has been added later.
Miami, 15 March 2001
Jack L. Davies
Chapter 1: Historical Background on Somali Unity
1.1 How the Somalis Lived Before Separation
From around the 9'th century to the 14'th century AD, for several hundred years before the colonialists arrived in Eastern Africa, there was a loose collection of city states with the collective name of "Shungwaya" -- that is unfortunately not well documented in written history. "Shungwaya" is a Bantu word, that had several different meanings simultaneously: a cultural belief system and set of legends, a form of government, and actual city-state governments.
According to the Shungwaya legends, there was a unified city state along the coast covering the territory from approximately Berbera in the North to Northern Tanzania in the South, called "Greater Shungwaya". However, it broke up into different smaller city states that were culturally related but politically relatively independent. Around 1071, Shungwaya sent an ambassador to China. Examples of some such cities include locations: near Berbera, at Kelafo inside of Ethiopia today on the Shebelle River, at Hobbio, near Mogadishu, and along the Coast between Mogadishu and Malindi. The Ajuran Imamate from about 1500 to 1650 AD and centered around Kelafo on the Shebelle River played a central role in Somali history.1
This was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual political system. To the Southwest, Bantu ethnic groups and languages predominated and to the Northeast Cushitic ethnic groups and languages predominated. The political structure of city states reflects the primarily nomadic occupation of the people, with traders centralized in cities on good trading routes, and without clear "national borders" as are common today for "nation states" of farmers, as in Europe.
The Somali ethnic group came into existence around 1200 AD, when a small number of Arab settlers along the coast between Zeila and Bosaso married local Cushitic indigenous women, combining the Arab clan-structure system with the Cushitic/Shungwaya political/cultural system and a Cushitic language.2 This young ethnic group flourished, possibly due to innovative nomadic techniques brought from Arabia, spreading deeply into present Ethiopia and Kenya, displacing other Cushitic groups, such as the Oramo ethnic group, and Bantu people who lived here earlier.
In parallel with this ethnic displacement of Somalis expanding and displacing other ethnic groups within this larger system, Christianity and Islam were already displacing earlier animist religions throughout the whole system, but in forms modified by the earlier animist religions and the regional cultural belief system.
1.2 How the Somalis Became Separated
The colonialists came to East Africa and started to draw lines on maps to delineate colonial borders like the national borders of the nation states in Europe. These colonial borders introduced artificial rigidity along lines in the sand replacing the flexibility normally associated with nomadic groups of people around the World.
In 1884 to 1885, Great Britain signed nearly identical separate treaties with the
Isa group of clans (whose territory is in Djibouti, the Republic of Somaliland, and Ethiopia today),
Gadabuursi group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today),
Habr Garhagis group of Isaq clans (the Habr Yunis and Eidegalla clans, whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today),
Habr Awal clan of the Isaq group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today), and
Habr Tojaala clan of the Isaq group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today).
In 1896, Britain signed an additional treaty with Ahmed Murgan, "Chief of the Ogaden Somalis", mainly applying to the Mohamed Zubier subclan of the Ogadeni clan (who live in the territory known as Region 5 of Ethiopia today).
France signed similar treaties with the Isa group of clans and Afar ethnic group living in Djibouti. Italy signed similar treaties with the major clans living in Southern Somalia (the former Italian Somalia) and across the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya today.
A general map of "Greater Somalia" is shown below in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1-1: Location of "Greater Somalia" and its Surroundings
The main motivations of Great Britain in establishing the British Somaliland Protectorate were
to create a secure source of food, mainly meat, for its military bases in Aden, and
to prevent other European colonial powers from claiming all of the East-African coast and thereby hampering British naval and trading operations in this region.
The main motivation of the Somali clans in signing these treaties with Great Britain, as well as with France and Italy, was to obtain European protection for their territorial integrity, particularly from encroachments by neighboring Ethiopia.
Great Britain signed a treaty with the Ogadeni clan in the Ogaden in 1896, promising to protect the sovereignty of the Ogaden, particularly from Ethiopia. Only one year later, Great Britain ceded the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1897 -- in a secret treaty, whereby the Ogadenis did not discover this treachery until several decades later.
In 1948, Great Britain gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia a second time, claiming that their treaty with Ethiopia in 1897 was a valid treaty with a recognized country according to international law, which had a higher precedence over their earlier treaties with the Somali clans in 1894 and 1896 promising to protect their sovereignty. In 1954, Great Britain also ceded the Haud, an additional 24-mile wide strip of land along the border with British Somaliland, to Ethiopia. These actions created great protests and resentment among the Somalis, since this created artificial borders in the middle of the traditional nomadic grazing territory for many individual Somali clans. It also violated the solemn promises of Great Britain to protect the sovereignty of this Somali territory on behalf of the Somalis.
1.3 How the Borders Were Defined
The delineation between British Somaliland and French Somaliland may correspond roughly to an internal boundary among Isa clans, with the territory of the Mamasan clan in the Isa group of clans being in British Somaliland and other Isa clans being in French Somaliland. At the end of the last century, the dominant port of the Isas was the old port city of Zeila and a large fraction of all Isas were engaged in trade and transport between Zeila, across barren and dry lowlands, to Harar on the fertile Harar plateau, which was the economic, cultural, and political capital of this region.
From 1897 to 1903, France built the railroad between Djibouti and Dire Dawa, which lies lower and is more accessible for rail transport than Harar. This replaced the traditional trade route with camel caravans between Zeila and Harar with a new railroad route between Djibouti and Dire Dawa. One result was a displacement of Isa traders and transporters from Zeila to Djibouti. For this reason, 60% of the population of Djibouti today are Somalis, mainly Isas, but also including substantial numbers of Gadabuursi and Isaqs. As a result, the border between the RSL and Djibouti today has little connection to the ethnic and economic relationships that existed when it was drawn at the end of the last century, in terms of Somali clans living on one or the other side of it.
By contrast, the border from the coast inwards between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia reflects the clear clan boundaries that existed then and have been preserved until today. This border represents the general nomadic grazing border between the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans on the side of British Somaliland and the Majerteen clan on the side of Italian Somalia. Colonial rule until 1960 also served to cement this division into two separate economic zones under different colonial cultural influence, with
the port of Bosaso serving the Majerteens in Italian Somalia and
the smaller nearby ports of Las Koreh and Mait as well as the larger more-distant port of Berbera<> serving the Warsangelis and Dhulbahantes in British Somaliland.
During the first half of this century, a significant number of Warsangelis, Dhulbahantes, and Majerteens (all of whom belong to the same Harti subgroup within the Darod group of clans) moved South to areas near Kismayo along the border with Kenya and Mogadishu, i.e. in lower Juba with more fertile land than their original dry nomadic grazing areas in the North. Demands by these Hartis living in the distant South for reunification between the Republic of Somaliland and Southern Somalia, in order be legally reunited with their brothers in the North, are not based upon economic need for these two separate economic regions and should receive a corresponding lower priority and attention.
We do not yet have clear background information on how the border between Southern Somalia and Kenya was defined.
Particularly from the British perspective, the borders between French Somaliland, British Somaliland, and Italian Somalia were clearly defined going from the coast inwards. However, from the British perspective, the depths of these territories inland, bordering with Ethiopia, were less clear and relevant. Yet, there was considerable rivalry between the British and the French over the fertile and productive region around Harar, with their respective attempts to define their own hegemony deeper into this region, at the expense of the other. When it was convenient for their own interests, they interpreted the inner borders to be as deep as possible up to the border with non-Somali Ethiopia at that time.
A long-term problem has been that:
the British, French, and Italians seemed to think of their protectorates as territories defined by lines drawn on maps, whereby the lines defining the depth were unclear and changeable, to meet their desires, whereas
the Somalis who granted them rights in exchange for territorial protection thought that they were getting protection for the sovereignty of the land that they occupied and lived on.
When Britain gave independence to Kenya in 1962, it did conduct a referendum in October 1962 of the people living in the Northern Frontier District, mainly 250,000 Somalis with a smaller Oramo minority. The vast majority voted in favor of reunification with the Republic of Somalia. However, Great Britain acted against the expressed self-determination of the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District, by ceding it to Kenya instead of Somalia. The result has been continued political unrest and "shifta" warfare in the Northern Frontier District, so that Kenya inherited only problems with this "gift" and no benefits. It also resulted in political antagonism between Somalia and Kenya as neighbors.
When France granted independence to French Somaliland, their government decided to retain their independence and not to join the Republic of Somalia. One factor was the fact that 60% of the population were Somalis and 40% were Afars, who occupy 2/3 of Djibouti as well as the Danakil Desert in what is now Northeastern Ethiopia and Southern Eritrea.
In this way, Great Britain played the key role in dividing the loosely-organized Somali territory, in the tradition of Shungwaya, into the 5 Somali territories today:
Djibouti (60% Somali and 40% Afar),
Republic of Somaliland (100% Somali)
Region 5 of Eastern Ethiopia (nearly 100% Somali),
Italian Somalia (nearly 100% Somali), and
Northern Frontier District of Kenya (nearly 100% Somali and Oramo).
Although this partitioning of the Somalis, against their will and, in the case of the Ogaden, secretly for several decades, may have served short-term British political interests, it has laid the basis for much of the tension and conflict on the Horn-of-Africa during the post-colonial period.
The Charter of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and their Resolution 16(1) of July 1964 made the colonial borders sacrosanct, demanding that new state borders should coincide with the colonial boundaries.3 Most international lawyers agree that this policy by the OAU guarantees the colonial border between the former British Somaliland and Southern Somalia. This policy has been interpreted as blocking any changes in the locations of such borders, but not to block the elimination of such borders upon a unification between neighboring states, such as between Libya and Egypt, and not to block the re-instatement of such borders when such a unification fails, as was the case between Libya and Egypt. However, this official policy of the OAU, also supported by the International Community, probably has less weight at a lower level than international law.4
1.4 Partial Reunification in 1960
On 4 June 1946, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Bevin, proposed to the House of Commons that: "British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory".5 This policy proposal mobilized public opinion of the Somalis for reunification into a "Greater Somalia".
When Great Britain actually ceded the Ogaden to Ethiopia a second time in 1948 and ceded the Haud and Trust Territories to Ethiopia for the first time in the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954, this mobilized public opinion among the Somalis on both sides of this changing new border to strongly oppose separation and to favor reunification.
When Great Britain granted independence to British Somaliland on 26 June 1960, the two main political parties in Somaliland at that time had been formed earlier as parties of protest against the actions of Great Britain in ceding their territory to Ethiopia. They were the SNL (Somali National League) of the Isaqs and the USP (United Somali Party) of the Dhulbahantes. Therefore, reunification was the key local political issue at that time, whereby reunification with the just-lost Ogaden and Haud were highest in priority.
When Italy also granted independence to Italian Somalia five days later on 1 July 1960, this opened the technical opportunity for at least reunification between Somaliland and Somalia, even though this reunification had their lowest priority. Still, this bilateral reunification between Somaliland and Somalia appeared to be a positive step forwards towards the more-important components of reunification. In addition to reunification with the Ogaden and the Haud, the Somalilanders were hopeful that Britain would then allow at least the Northern Frontier District to join their union with Somalia and that French Somaliland would also join them later, when France granted independence. (Both of these hopes and anticipations remained unfulfilled!)
The Prime Minister in the last years of British Somaliland, as well as the President of the independent and internationally-recognized Somaliland for 5 days after it received independence until it joined Southern Somalia, was Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (who is also the current President of the Republic of Somaliland). He and other political leaders in Somaliland were cautious and generally opposed to any quick bilateral reunification with Southern Somalia without detailed negotiations. However, they already had a democracy and the majority of the citizens demanded immediate reunification with Southern Somalia as soon as Italy granted independence.
The Somalis in Southern Somalia were less interested in whether the Somalilanders joined them or not. Therefore, the reunification of Somaliland and Southern Somalia, on the day when Italy granted independence to the latter, was a result of the enthusiasm of the Somalilanders, tempered by the caution of their leaders. The International Community showed no interest in whether they joined or not at that time.
Somaliland drafted an "Act of Union" to be approved by the legislatures of Somaliland and Southern Somalia and then to be signed by representatives from both independent nation states. On 27 June, Somaliland's Legislative Assembly passed the "Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law", which incorporated their proposed Act of Union. This law was to come into force in the South as well, upon the signature by authorized representatives from the South -- but it was never signed by any representatives from the South. On 30 June 1960, the Legislative Assembly of the South approved a new "Act of Union", but only "in principle", and with its text differing substantially from the text of the Act of Union proposed by Somaliland. At midnight on 30 June 1960, the President of the Legislative Assembly of the South proclaimed the independence of a reunified State of Somalia.6
The draft Constitution had already been prepared in the South, together with Italian officials, before Great Britain granted independence to British Somaliland. Politicians from the North were not given an opportunity to make more than marginal changes in this draft Constitution. This added to the resentment by the Somalilanders to the way they were being treated by the South.
An important component of the unsigned Act of Union for reunification between Somaliland and Southern Somalia, was that a referendum must be held to confirm this reunification, before it became final. Because of the haste of the Somalilanders, they started the reunification before conducting this referendum. It quickly became apparent that the Somalilanders had granted too many compromises in their haste, such as accepting the capital in Mogadishu and a majority of the high-level positions going to Southerners.
When this referendum was finally taken, combined with a referendum on the proposed Constitution for the reunified state in June 1961, only 100,000 of the estimated 650,000 citizens of Somaliland voted, with approximately 70% opposing reunification with Southern Somalia and the proposed Constitution. But it was too late and Southern Somalia did not let the Somalilanders go.
This led to mutiny by senior Somalilander military officers, trying to restore independence in accordance with the incomplete treaty, but they were defeated and Somaliland was forcibly kept reunified with Southern Somalia. At the trial of these military officials, "the judge acquitted them on the basis that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland.7
Lawyers have pointed out that this bilateral precipitous reunification between Somaliland and Southern Somalia was never legally completed. It is therefore legally improper to speak of "secession" today, since reunification was never legally completed. This is like a marriage being "annulled" because it was never consummated, rather than a "divorce" to dissolve a legal marriage.
The main pre-occupation of the Somalis concerning reunification remained the important issue of reunification with the Ogaden, now Region 5 of Ethiopia.
Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre comes from the Marehan clan of the Darod group of clans. Only about one half of the Marehans live in Southern Somalia, with most living in the Ogaden and some in the Northern Frontier District. Within the clan-based political system in Somalia, the number of Marehans living in Somalia was too small to support a Marehan as President and Dictator. Therefore, Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre was only able to stay in power by a cunning political game of playing the larger clans off against each other, in shifting alliances with his own small and relatively insignificant Marehan clan. The Somalis spoke of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre ruling generally with an MOD Alliance (Marehan, Ogadeni, and Dhulbahante).
When Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre came to power with his coup in October 1969, "there were only four officers from his clan in the armed forces; it is now estimated [in 1982] that more than 60 percent of the officers are [Marehan] clan members".8
Since most of the Marehan and Ogadeni clansmen and a significant number of the Dhulbahante clansmen in this alliance live across the border in the Ogaden, this gave Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre a particular focus and priority for reunification of these three clans, who formed the cornerstone of his ruling alliance. This factor accentuated the local political pressures for reunification and caused constant political conflict with two wars between Somalia and Ethiopia.
This clan aspect had other important consequences. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre was present at a traditional inter-clan battle as a child, where his father was killed by an Isaq. This led to personal hatred by Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre against the Isaq group of clans, who make up 66% of the population in Somaliland, and led him to conduct a systematic program of genocide against them, starting in 1980.9 At most, Somaliland was only a subjugated colony for Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre to exploit and oppress, while he aspired to genuine reunification with his clansmen in the Ogaden.
Footnotes for Chapter 1
1. "Shungwaya, the Segeju and Somali History", James de Vere Allen, in "Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies", University of Hamburg, August 1-6,1983, edited by Dr. Thomas Labahn.
2. "A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate: 1944 - 1950" by John A. Hunt, published by the British Colonial Office in 1951.
3. "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland", B. Rajagopal and Anthony Carroll, 27 May 1992, pp. 44. (A commissioned legal analysis - later published in the American University Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol. 8:653, 1993.)
4. It could be interesting to examine the actual texts of the Charter and this Resolution of the OAU, to determine which border between Somaliland and Ethiopia is guaranteed, i.e. if the act of Great Britain in ceding the Haud and the Protected Territories in 1954 violated this policy and rule.
5. "The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland", B. Rajagopal and Anthony J. Carroll, 27 May 1992, pp.11. (See footnote 3 above.)
6. Ibid. Rajagopal and Carroll, pp. 13-14.
7. Ibid. Rajagopal and Carroll, pp. 15.
8. "Don't Aid Somalia", Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, New York Times, 5 March 1982.
9. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre frequently referred to the Isaqs as being "his Jews" and to the Holocaust by Adolph Hitler in Germany as his model for exterminating "his Jews".
The first Somali immigrants came to the United States in the 1920s and settled in the New York area.
Clans constitute the heart of Somali society, and the central challenge facing modern Somalia is how to unify a country whose people often give greater allegiance to lineage than to nation.
The Somali People
Before the civil war, the population of Somalia was estimated at 7.7 million people. It is believed that about 400,000 people died of famine or disease or were killed in the war, and nearly 45% of the population was displaced inside Somalia or fled to neighboring countries, to the Middle East, or to the West.
Somalia's population is mostly rural. Nearly 80% of the people are pastoralists, agriculturalists, or agropastoralists. Except for a small number of Somalis who rely on fishing, the rest of the population are urban dwellers. Somalia's chief cities and towns are Mogadishu* (the capital), Hargeisa, Burao, Berbera, Bossaso, Marka, Brava, Baidoa, and Kismaayo. In the past few years, civil war and famine have changed urban demographics, as hundreds of thousands of displaced Somalis have poured into the cities seeking sanctuary and relief.
Ethnically and culturally, Somalia is one of the most homogeneous countries in Africa. Somalia has its minorities: There are people of Bantu descent living in farming villages in the south, and Arab enclaves in the coastal cities. A small number of Europeans, mostly Italians, live on farms in the south. But the great majority of the people are ethnic Somalis who speak dialects of the same language, Somali, and who practice the same religion, Islam. In a land of sparse rainfall, more than half the population are pastoralists or agropastoralists who raise camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. There are farmers, mostly in the south and northwest, and in recent years a new urban group of government workers, shopkeepers, and traders has emerged, but it is the nomadic way of life, with its love of freedom and open spaces, that is celebrated in Somali poetry and folklore.
Clans constitute the heart of Somali society, and the central challenge facing modern Somalia is how to unify a country whose people often give greater allegiance to lineage than to nation. It is important to note, however, that while Somalis have traditionally fought among themselves, their greater identity as Somalis takes hold in front of strangers.
*We apologize to Somalis who may object to seeing Anglicized spelling of Somali words. The official Somali orthography uses letters of the Latin alphabet, but in a manner which departs from the orthographic conventions of English. We have used Anglicized spellings for proper names for the sake of the reader who would not recognize Muqdisha, Cali, and Maxammed as Somali renderings of Mogadishu, Ali, and Mohammed.
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Somali Map
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